Conditional Market Timing in the Mutual Fund Industry by Tchamyou, Vanessa & Asongu, Simplice
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Conditional Market Timing in the
Mutual Fund Industry
Vanessa Tchamyou and Simplice Asongu
January 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82633/
MPRA Paper No. 82633, posted 11 November 2017 18:50 UTC
1 
 
A G D I   Working Paper 
 
 
 
WP/17/028 
 
 
Conditional Market Timing in the Mutual Fund Industry 
 
 
Published in Research in International Business and Finance, 42, pp. 1355-136 (2017) 
 
 
Vanessa S. Tchamyou 
African Governance and Development Institute, 
P.O. Box 8413, Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail: simenvanessa@yahoo.com  / 
simenvanessa@afridev.org 
 
Simplice A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute, 
P.O. Box 8413, Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com  / 
asongus@afridev.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
2017 African Governance and Development Institute                                               WP/17/028 
 
 
Research Department  
 
 
Conditional Market Timing in the Mutual Fund Industry 
 
  
Vanessa S. Tchamyou  & Simplice A. Asongu  
 
 
January 2017 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study complements the scarce literature on conditional market timing in the mutual fund 
industry by assessing determinants of market timing throughout the distribution of market 
exposure. It builds on the intuition that the degree of responsiveness by fund managers to 
investigated factors (aggregate liquidity, information asymmetry, volatility and market excess 
return) is contingent on their levels of market exposure. To this end, we use a panel of 1467 
active open-end mutual funds for the period 2004-2013. Fund-specific time-dynamic beta is 
employed and we avail room for more policy implications by disaggregating the dataset into 
market fundamentals of: equity, fixed income, allocation and tax preferred. The empirical 
evidence is based on Quantile regressions. The following findings are established. First, there 
is consistent positive threshold evidence of volatility and market return in market timing, with 
the slim exception of allocation funds for which the pattern of volatility is either U- or S-
shaped. Second, the effect of volatility and market return are consistently positive and 
negative respectively in the bottom and top quintiles of market exposure, but for allocation 
funds. Third, the effects of information asymmetry and aggregate liquidity are positive and 
negative, contingent on specifications, level of market exposure and market fundamentals. 
The findings broadly suggest that blanket responses of market exposures to investigated 
factors are unlikely to represent feasible strategies for fund managers unless they are 
contingent on initial levels of market exposure and tailored differently across ‘highly 
exposed’-fund managers and ‘lowly exposed’-fund managers. Implications for investors and 
fund managers are discussed.  
 
Key words: Mutual funds; Market timing; Thresholds; Quantile regression  
JEL Classification:  C52; G12; G14; G18.   
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1. Introduction  
Over the past decades, the popularity of mutual funds has grown rapidly. Hence, instead of 
getting into equity markets directly, investors have tended to prefer mutual funds (Wu, 2011). 
Though, the performance of active mutual funds has been widely explored in the literature. In 
other to deliver high performance, investment managers use different means like quantitative 
methods, quantitative models plus additional information such as information on managers; 
press articles or investment analysts (Bassett Jr & Chen, 2001). The assessment of the 
performance is sometimes contingent on the market timing skills of managers of active 
mutual funds.  
Market timing is a situation where a timer seizes the opportunity of market fluctuations. He or 
she can rebalance portfolio or switch asset allocations. Should the timer’s forecast market 
expected return be accurate, he/she would be rewarded with a better performance relative to 
benchmark portfolio characterised with a constant beta that is equivalent to the timer’s 
portfolio average beta. Starting with the fundamental study of Trenor and Mazuy (1966), 
several authors have worked on the ability of active mutual funds managers to time the 
market. Trenor and Mazuy (1966) used a sample of 57 funds between 1957 and 1962 and 
found evidence of timing ability only in one fund. They reached the conclusion that 
investment managers cannot outguess the market. Considerable studies reached the same 
conclusion of little evidence of market timing in the mutual fund industry. For instance, (1) 
Kon (1983) found evidence of market timing at the individual fund level but no evidence 
when funds are grouped; (2) Chang and Lewellen (1984) studied a sample of 67 monthly 
mutual funds and found that only few fund managers seem to exhibit some ability to time the 
market  ;  (3) Henriksson (1984) found evidence of market timing in only 3 funds out of the 
118 studied and (4) Mansor et al. (2015) analysed 106 Malaysian equity funds and found that 
evidence of market timing disappeared when employing panel regressions. 
However, inquiries by Bollen and Busse (2001) have found evidence of market forecast 
among managers of active mutual funds. Bollen and Busse (2001) emphasised the importance 
of the frequency of data. Using daily data of 230 mutual funds, they found evidence of market 
timing skill in a substantial numbers of funds. Applying holding-based measures, Jiang et al. 
(2007) found a positive timing ability of mutual fund managers. It is important to note that 
their sample is only made of equity funds. 
Every fund managers do not time the market exactly the same way since they do not have 
access to the same information. Therefore, the market timing may be contingent on the set of 
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information each fund manager has. Some studies in the existing literature have employed 
conditional market timing to assess the performance of funds in terms of market timing skill. 
The concept of conditional market timing has been explored in different perspectives, but 
mostly conditioned on public versus private information. Ferson and Schadt (1996) advocate 
the conditional performance evaluation of mutual funds, conditioned on public information. 
They use a sample of 67 monthly mutual funds for the period 1968-1990 and their findings 
reveal statistical and economical results when applying conditional information. Therefore, 
the responsiveness of funds to public information changes with risk exposure. More recently, 
Dahr and Mandal (2014) have also employed the conditional performance evaluation to 
investigate the performance of Indian mutual funds with respect to the ability of fund 
managers to forecast the market. Using 80 mutual funds schemes over the period 2000-2012, 
they found that the conditioning on public information improves the coefficient of 
determination when applying the unconditional Henriksson-Merton and Treynor-Mazuy 
models under the same period. 
The findings of Dahr and Mandal run counter to those earlier established by Becker et al. 
(1999) on the evidence of market timing skills from active mutual fund managers. They made 
a distinction between timing based on publicly available information which can be captured 
by some instrumental variables and timing based on better information. They call the latter 
“Conditional market timing”.  Analysing a sample of 400 U.S. mutual funds over 1976 – 1994 
period, with conditioning based on public information, they find that mutual funds are highly 
risk averse and no evidence of a significant timing ability in the market. Taking into account 
the conditional perspective, Saez (2008) and Holmes and Faff (2004) also found very little 
evidence of market timing ability. 
The engaged literature clearly leaves room for improvement on two fronts, namely: the need 
to assess market timing in the mutual fund industry beyond equity funds on the one hand and 
on the other hand, assess how market factors affect market timing when existing levels of 
market timing are considered. To put the above points into more perspective, as discussed 
above, the concept of market timing has been more studied with equity funds for the most 
part. However, the timing ability of funds managers should not be limited only to equity funds 
(Elton et al., 2011). Hence, we complement equity funds with fixed income, allocation, tax 
preferred funds.   
This study contributes to the literature by investigating the roles of information asymmetry 
and other factors on market timing throughout the conditional distribution of market timing. 
This second contribution builds on the fact that the degree of responsiveness by fund 
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managers with low market exposure to the conditioning information set (aggregate liquidity; 
information asymmetry and volatility) should intuitively be different from managers that are 
characterised with higher market exposure. Moreover, it is very likely that fund managers 
with low market exposure are associated with a higher level of information asymmetry and 
vice versa. Hence, from logic and intuition, the response of fund managers to information 
asymmetry is very likely to be contingent on the level of market exposure fund managers are 
acquainted with.  
The rest article is organised as follows. Data, methodology and estimation procedure 
are presented in section 2. Section 3 documents the empirical analysis and results. Section 4 
presents concluding implications and future research directions. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data  
We analyse annual open-end mutual fund returns from the Morningstar Direct database for 
the period 2004 to 2013. We divide our sample into four sub-samples based on the Global 
Broad Category Group of Morningstar: equity, fixed-income, allocation and tax-preferred 
funds. We study each sub-sample in detail to compare the responsiveness of fund managers to 
each type of fund on the conditional distribution of market exposure. 
We apply a filter to remove all missing values due to methodological constraint and end-up 
with a strongly balanced panel dataset of 882 equity funds, 243 fixed-income funds, 156 
allocation funds and 186 tax-preferred funds. As result, we have 1467 active mutual funds for 
10 years.  The definitions of variables and fund categories are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 1 
      
Summary statistics 
     
This table presents the Summary statistics of variables used in our analysis in panel A and fund 
categories in panel B. Std. Dev.: Standard Deviation. Min.: Minimum. Max. : Maximum. Obs.: 
Observations. 
 
Panel A : Variables       
      
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      
Beta 8928 -0.018 0.932 -4.502 4.571 
Info. Asymmetry 8928 19.467 15.245 0.000 93.425 
Volatility 7440 19.467 12.115 0.691 64.902 
Mkt Excess Return 14880 8.578 19.038 -38.39 35.15 
Aggregate Liquidity 14880 -0.025 0.028 -0.098 0.010 
SMB  14880 3.003 7.485 -7.01 17.74 
HML 14880 2.411 12.342 -21.55 23.66 
      
Panel B: Fund categories     
      
Equity 14880 0.592 0.491 0 1 
Fixed income 14880 0.163 0.369 0 1 
Allocation 14880 0.104 0.306 0 1 
Tax preferred 14880 0.125 0.330 0 1 
       SMB: Size. HML: Book to market. Std. Dev.: Standard Deviation. Min.: Minimum. Max. : Maximum. Obs.: Observations. 
 
 The summary statistics for various types of mutual fund and variables are discussed in 
Panel A and Panel B respectively of Table 1. Two motivations underpin the summary 
statistics. One on the hand, it is apparent that the variables are comparable from the 
perspective of mean values. On the other hand, corresponding variations from the standard 
deviations is an indication that we can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages will 
result from the empirical analysis.  
Table 2 discloses the correlation matrix. It enables the study to avoid concerns about 
multicollinearity that could lead to variables with a high degree of substitution entering into 
conflict and reflecting unexpected signs in the estimation output. Therefore, in specifications 
of the main equation, ‘aggregate liquidity’ and ‘market excess return’ are not involved the 
same estimation owing their high degree of substitution. This is consistent with a caution from 
Cao et al. (2013, p. 285) that high market return is strongly associated with market liquidity. 
In accordance with Bodson et al. (2013), book-to-market and market size are entered into the 
same equation when estimating the beta variable for market timing. 
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Table 2  
Correlation matrix  
 
This table presents the correlation matrix of variables used in our analysis 
Info.  
Asymmetry 
Volatility Mkt Excess 
Return 
SMB HML Aggregate 
Liquidity 
Beta  
        
1.0000 0.1868 -0.0125 -0.0413 -0.0307 0.0137 0.0186 Info. Asymmetry 
 1.0000 -0.0418 -0.0308 -0.0090 0.0337 0.0050 Volatility 
  1.0000 0.5516 0.5184 0.7498 0.0231 Mkt Excess Return 
   1.0000 0.7186 0.0298 -0.0201 SMB 
    1.0000 0.2964 0.0123 HML 
     1.0000 0.0512 Aggregate Liquidity 
      1.0000 Beta 
SMB: Size. HML: Book to market.  
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Estimation of volatility, beta and information asymmetry 
Various measurements for information asymmetry have been proposed in the literature. 
Tchamyou  and Asongu (2017),  Asongu et al. (2016) have used private credit bureaus and public 
credit registries as proxies for ‘reducing information asymmetry’ in the banking industry. Dai et 
al. (2013) have employed the standard deviation of return’s idiosyncratic risk to investigate how 
mutual fund ownership and information asymmetry affect the management of earnings by listed 
companies.  In accordance with the same definition, the cost originating from information 
asymmetry between elements of a syndicated bank loan has been examined by Ivashina (2009). 
Dierken (1991) has used four indicators to appreciate information asymmetry between the market 
and firm managers within the context of equity.  What is common among these studies is the fact 
that information asymmetry is proxied as the difference between realised and expected returns. 
This study is in line with the underlying intuition for the estimation of uncertainty in information 
as well as asymmetric information. Therefore, we compute information asymmetry as the 
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic risk of returns1. Within this context, asymmetric 
information corresponds to the standard deviations of individual returns’ residuals, in which case 
standard errors are equal to the standard deviation of residuals. Accordingly, whereas the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) augmented with the Fama-French 3-factor model (here after FF) 
(see Eq.2 below) is employed for the computation of asymmetric information, a stochastic 
modelling estimation process is used to derive volatility or uncertainty. The approach we adopt 
                                                 
1
 The idiosyncratic risk of return is similar to abnormal returns. This corresponds to the variation between the realized 
return and expected return. 
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for the of estimation volatility, beta and information asymmetry is consistent with Tchamyou et al. 
(2017).  
Returns’ volatility is estimated as the standard errors corresponding to the first order auto-
regressive processes of the returns. In accordance with Kangoye (2013), owing to the low 
frequency nature of our data, volatilities or uncertainties cannot be computed with GARCH 
(Generalized Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) models. Hence, auto-regressive 
estimations are employed. It follows that the Kangoye (2013) estimation process is employed to 
estimate volatility because the dataset consists of open-end mutual funds of annual periodicity. 
Therefore, uncertainty corresponds to the saved RMSE2 (Root-Mean_Square Error) of each return 
obtained from the first autoregressive processes. The computation process is summarised in the 
following equation. 
 tititi TRR ,1,,      ,      (1) 
where tiR ,  is the return of fund i  at time t ; 1, tiR
 
the return of fund i  at time 1t  ; T the time 
trend; the constant ;
 
  the parameter and ti ,  the error term.  
We model mutual fund returns with the FF three factors model to estimate fund-specific 
systematic risk. 
titiHMLtiSMBttiMKTitfti HMLSMBMKTRR ,,,,,,,    , (2) 
where fR is the risk free rate. MKT is the market excess return, SMB  Small [market 
capitalization] Minus Big and HML  High [book-to-market ratio] Minus Low. The previous 3 
factors are taken from the Kenneth French's website3.  
 
A simple view of information asymmetry can then be modelled as follows: 


   tititi RRIA ,,, 
         (3)  
Where IAis Information Asymmetry;  the standard deviation; 
 
tiR ,  the realised return of 
fund i  at time t ;  

tiR ,
 
the  expected return computed using the FF 3 factor model. 
 
The dynamic beta corresponding to each mutual fund is estimated as a proxy for market exposure 
or market time. The advantage of employing betas is that it captures more market heterogeneities 
because in each year a distinct beta is computed for each fund. It is important to note that time-
                                                 
2
 The RMSE (Root-Mean-Square Error) can be employed as a measure of uncertainty or  as the standard deviation of 
residuals (see Kitagawa & Okuda, 2013).  
3
 Kenneth French's website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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static beta have the shortcoming of failing to capture some inherent variations that could 
substantially help in the elucidation of the market timing ability of fund managers. In essence, the 
mainstream literature has cautioned that assets’ betas may vary over time (see Ferson & Schadt, 
1996, p. 428). Using the Rollreg Stata command, we estimate the time-varying beta and RMSE 
for asymmetric information in Equation 2. Considering that there is a time-window that is higher 
than the number of independent indictors by at least one degree of freedom, a five-year moving-
window is adopted because four missing observations are apparent in each fund. It is important to 
note that four observations are automatically missing because we are using four independent 
variables of interest.  
In order to estimate the indicator of liquidity, the aggregate liquidity factors from an updated 
series by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) are used. Consistent with Bodson et al. (2013), all factors 
are retrieved from the website of Robert Stambaugh4. Given that liquidity data is in months, 
whereas the mutual fund data is annual, annual averages are computed with the monthly data.  
 
2.2.2. Estimation technique  
Consistent with the motivation of the study, estimation techniques that are based on mean 
values of market timing can only result in blanket practical implications for fund managers. 
Hence, approaches based on mean values of the dependent variable like Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) and the Generalised Method of Moments (see Tchamyou et al., 2017) reflect 
the underlying shortcoming. Accordingly, they estimate the linear conditional mean functions 
and articulate the central trend of the dependent variables. Consequently, they do not take into 
account the distribution of the tails. Hence, a Quantile Regression (QR) approach is applied in 
this study to address the discussed shortcomings from estimation techniques that are based on 
mean values of the market timing’s distribution. In essence, the QR is employed in this study 
to investigate the determinants of market exposure throughout the conditional distribution of 
market timing (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). The QR is based on median regression and was 
developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978). While the OLS supposes the normal distribution 
between the error term and the dependent variables, the QR is not established on this 
hypothesis. According to Lee and Saltoglu (2001), the main advantage of the QR technique is 
its capacity of producing more robust estimates (Koenker & Basett, 1982). The application of 
QR is increasing in the finance literature, notably in: (i) analysing risk in mutual funds (Wang 
                                                 
4
 Robert Stambaugh's Website: http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~stambaugh/ 
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et al., 2015) and (ii) examining the relationship between fund governance and performance 
(Chen & Huang, 2011). 
 In accordance with recent QR literature (Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Asongu et al., 2017), 
the  th quintile estimator of market timing is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (3) for ease of 
presentation.   
  
    

  
 



 


ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
 ,     
(4) 
where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum 
of squared residuals, with QR, we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For 
instance the 10th or 90th quintiles (with  =0.10 or 0.90 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of market timing or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/( ,                            (5) 
 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintiles. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of market timing. For the model in Eq. (5), the dependent 
variable iy  is the market timing indicator, while ix  contains a constant term, information 
asymmetry, market excess return and aggregate liquidity.  
 
3. Empirical results 
While Table 3 presents findings corresponding to the full sample, the results of the remaining 
tables pertain to sub-samples.  Accordingly, Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 
respectively correspond to equity funds, fixed income funds, tax-preferred funds and 
allocation funds. There are two main specifications corresponding to each table: one 
specification without aggregate liquidity and another specification without market excess 
return. The two specifications are used to address the apparent concern of multicollinearity or 
high degree of substitution between market excess return and aggregate liquidity.  
For all tables disclosing the empirical results, consistent difference in estimates from market 
exposure determinants between OLS and quintiles (in terms of sign, significance and 
magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of adopted empirical strategy. Since, the 
effect of the independent variables are investigated through the conditional distribution of 
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market exposure, the corresponding trend in tendencies could take several patterns, inter alia: 
S-shaped, U-shaped, inverted U-shaped and positive or negative threshold shapes. The notion 
of threshold adopted in this study is consistent with Asongu (2014). In essence, a positive 
threshold is apparent when throughout the distribution of market exposure, the estimates 
consistently display decreasing negative magnitudes and/or increasing positive magnitudes. In 
the same vein, a negative threshold is established when an estimated coefficient consistently 
displays decreasing positive and/or increasing negative magnitudes throughout the conditional 
distribution of market exposure. In other words, a positive threshold denotes consistent 
incremental effects of the underlying estimate on market exposure.   
The following findings can be established from Table 3 which shows results of the full 
sample. First, information asymmetry significantly affects market exposure in the bottom 
quintiles, with a negative (positive) effect (s) in the 10th (25th and 50th) quintile(s). Second, 
positive thresholds are apparent from the effects of volatility and market excess return. Third, 
aggregate liquidity has a positive effect on market exposure in the top quintiles.  
In Table 4 which shows results of the equity funds sub-sample, the findings of the full sample 
are broadly confirmed with the exception that the positive effect from aggregate liquidity is 
now also significant in the 25th and 50th quintiles.  Looking at Table 5 which shows results of 
the fixed-income funds sub-sample, the findings of the full sample are broadly confirmed with 
the exception that the effect of information asymmetry is consistently negative in the top 
quintiles of the market exposure distribution.  From Table 6  on the results of the tax-preferred  
funds sub-sample, findings of the full sample are broadly confirmed with the exception that  
the effect of aggregate liquidity is not negative (positive) in the top quintiles of market 
exposure. In Table 7 which presents findings of the sub-sample corresponding to allocation 
funds: (i) information asymmetry positively affects market exposure from the 10th to the 50th 
quintiles; (ii) the incidence of volatility is U-shaped on the left-hand-side and S-shaped in the 
right-hand-side; (iii) market excess return displays a positive threshold effect from the 25th to 
the 90th quintiles whereas aggregate liquidity positively (negatively) affects market exposure 
in the 90th (10th, 25th and 75th) quintile (s).  
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Table 3 
            
Quantile regression based on full sample 
             
This table presents the quantile regression of the determinants of market timing. 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. P-values are in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² is for OLS and 
Pseudo R² for Quantile regression. I.A: Information Asymmetry. MKT: Market Excess Return. AggLiq: Aggregate Liquidity. Lower quantiles 
(e.g., Q 0.10) signify fund where market exposure is least. 
             
 Dependent variable: Beta   
 Specifications with MKT Specifications with AggLig 
             
 OLS  Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS  Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -0.000 -0.030 -0.105** 0.050 0.059** 0.133*** 0.001 -0.552*** -0.317*** 0.010 0.302*** 0.674*** 
 
(0.999) (0.386) (0.020) (0.208) (0.032) (0.004) (0.964) (0.000) (0.000) (0.733) (0.000) (0.000) 
I.A 0.001** -0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 -0.000 0.001** 0.001 0.002** 0.002*** -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.041) (0.000) (0.215) (0.003) (0.149) (0.683) (0.027) (0.115) (0.046) (0.001) (0.769) (0.233) 
Volatility  -0.000 -0.026*** -0.013*** -0.001 0.015*** 0.023*** -0.000 -0.023*** -0.013*** -0.001 0.014*** 0.022*** 
 
(0.968) (0.000) (0.000) (0.146) (0.000) (0.000) (0.905) (0.000) (0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.000) 
MKT -0.001 -0.020*** -0.010*** -0.002*** 0.006*** 0.021*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.105) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)       
AggLiq. --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.630*** -0.881 -1.395 0.761 6.090*** 10.219*** 
 
      (0.000) (0.194) (0.108) (0.267) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
            
R²/ Pseudo R² 0.001 0.089 0.024 0.001 0.029 0.078 0.002 0.0403 0.0144 0.001 0.032 0.043 
Fisher  2.56*      9.00***      
 
(0.053)      (0.000)      
Observations  7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 7440 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
            
Quantile regression based on equity funds 
             
This table presents the quantile regression of the determinants of market timing based on equity funds. 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. P-values are in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² is for OLS and 
Pseudo R² for Quantile regression. I.A: Information Asymmetry. MKT: Market Excess Return. AggLiq: Aggregate Liquidity. Lower quantiles 
(e.g., Q 0.10) signify fund where market exposure is least. 
             
 Dependent variable: Beta 
 Specifications with MKT Specifications with AggLig 
             
 OLS  Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS  Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 0.157*** -0.078 0.024 0.283*** 0.188*** 0.272*** 0.072* -0.683*** -0.275*** 0.131*** 0.356*** 0.711*** 
 
(0.001) (0.135) (0.621) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
I.A 0.001* -0.004*** 0.001 0.002** 0.000 -0.000 0.002** 0.002 0.002* 0.002* -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.096) (0.000) (0.139) (0.019) (0.669) (0.717) (0.022) (0.313) (0.054) (0.052) (0.426) (0.617) 
Volatility  -0.003** -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.003** 0.016*** 0.020*** -0.003** -0.024*** -0.018*** -0.004*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
MKT -0.007*** -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.011*** 0.002* 0.022*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000)       
AggLiq. --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.562*** -0.883 3.076*** 0.131*** 6.573*** 7.035*** 
 
      (0.000) (0.589) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
            
R²/ Pseudo R² 0.008 0.111 0.042 0.011 0.018 0.067 0.007 0.036 0.023 0.003 0.025 0.031 
Fisher  9.67***      14.20***      
 
(0.000)      (0.000)      
Observations  4410 4410 4410 4410 4410 4410 4410 4410 4410 4410 4410 4410 
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Table 5 
            
Quantile regression based on fixed-income funds 
             
This table presents the quantile regression of the determinants of market timing based on fixed-income funds. 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. P-values are in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² is for OLS and 
Pseudo R² for Quantile regression. IA: Information Asymmetry. MKT: Market Excess Return. AggLiq: Aggregate Liquidity. Lower quantiles 
(e.g., Q 0.10) signify fund where market exposure is least. 
             
 Dependent variable: Beta 
 Specifications with MKT Specifications with AggLig 
             
 OLS  Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS  Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -0.206*** -0.067 -0.035 -0.012 -0.080 -0.111 0.042 -0.256*** -0.048 0.113*** 0.321*** 0.878*** 
 (0.007) (0.401) (0.544) (0.819) (0.197) (0.356) (0.406) (0.000) (0.285) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
I.A -0.003* 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.004** -0.008*** -0.004* 0.005 0.003* -0.000 -0.007*** -0.009*** 
 (0.087) (0.126) (0.116) (0.271) (0.012) (0.004) (0.056) (0.101) (0.085) (0.572) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility  0.002 -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.009*** 0.014*** 0.032*** 0.002 -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.010*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 
 (0.385) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.459) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MKT 0.009*** -0.011*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.025*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.829) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
AggLiq. --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.077*** 2.396 -0.706 -0.781 5.885*** 17.681*** 
       (0.001) (0.184) (0.557) (0.351) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
R²/ Pseudo R² 0.016 0.108 0.055 0.023 0.061 0.166 0.008 0.088 0.055 0.015 0.048 0.113 
Fisher  5.16***      3.98***      
 (0.001)      (0.007)      
Observations  1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
            
Quantile regression based on tax-preferred funds 
             
This table presents the quantile regression of the determinants of market timing based on tax-preferred funds. 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. P-values are in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² is for OLS and 
Pseudo R² for Quantile regression. I.A: Information Asymmetry. MKT: Market Excess Return. AggLiq: Aggregate Liquidity. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.10) signify fund where market exposure is least. 
             
 Dependent variable: Beta 
 Specifications with MKT Specifications with AggLig 
             
 OLS  Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS  Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 0.005 -0.411*** -0.051 0.004 0.187** 0.373*** 0.079 -0.810*** -0.283*** 0.011 0.349*** 1.077*** 
 
(0.932) (0.000) (0.404) (0.975) (0.022) (0.000) (0.256) (0.000) (0.000) (0.902) (0.000) (0.000) 
I.A 0.000 0.005 -0.003** -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.947) (0.126) (0.028) (0.535) (0.894) (0.740) (0.915) (0.630) (0.408) (0.688) (0.930) (0.669) 
Volatility  -0.001 -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.0015 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.001 -0.006** -0.008*** -0.001 0.007*** -0.000 
 
(0.338) (0.000) (0.000) (0.639)   (0.000) (0.002) (0.329) (0.039) (0.000) (0.594) 
 
(0.000) (0.982) 
MKT 0.004** -0.012*** -0.003** 0.003 0.006** 0.025*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.042) (0.001) (0.027) (0.242) (0.011) (0.000)       
AggLiq. --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.735 -12.609*** -7.148*** -1.968 3.477** 11.222*** 
 
      (0.200) (0.000) (0.000) (0.346)   (0.011) (0.000) 
 
            
R²/ Pseudo R² 0.006 0.0330 0.0211 0.0014 0.0195 0.0715 0.002 0.0609 0.0424 0.0014 0.0179 0.0374 
Fisher  1.67      0.89      
 
(0.171)      (0.443)      
Observations  930 930 930 930 930 930 930 930 930 930 930 930 
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Table 7 
            
Quantile regression based on allocation funds 
             
This table presents the quantile regression of the determinants of market timing based on allocation funds. 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. P-values are in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² is for OLS and 
Pseudo R² for Quantile regression. I.A: Information Asymmetry. MKT: Market Excess Return. AggLiq: Aggregate Liquidity. Lower quantiles 
(e.g., Q 0.10) signify fund where market exposure is least. 
 
             
 Dependent variable: Beta 
 Specifications with MKT Specifications with AggLig 
             
 OLS  Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS  Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -0.534*** -1.263*** -0.645*** -0.324*** -0.157 0.018 -0.512*** -1.311*** -1.118*** -0.381*** -0.077 0.310*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.152) (0.868) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.229) (0.000) 
I.A 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.000 -0.000 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.648) (0.849) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.708) (0.728) 
Volatility  0.017*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.033*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.024*** 0.034*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MKT 0.003 -0.001 -0.010*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.013*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
(0.169) (0.558) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)       
AggLiq. --- --- --- --- --- --- -3.795** -5.651** -7.974*** -2.117 -2.611*   6.583** 
 
      (0.013) (0.016) (0.000) (0.186) (0.054) (0.012) 
 
            
R²/ Pseudo R² 0.092 0.045 0.076 0.059 0.080 0.117 0.096 0.052 0.085 0.057 0.072 0.094 
Fisher  32.04***      27.78***      
 
(0.000)      (0.000)      
Observations  780 780 780 780 780 780 780 780 780 780 780 780 
 
 
4. Concluding implications and future research direction  
This study has complemented the scarce literature on conditional market timing in the mutual 
fund industry by assessing determinants of market timing throughout the conditional 
distribution of market exposure. It builds on the intuition that the degree of responsiveness by 
fund managers to investigated factors (aggregate liquidity, information asymmetry, volatility 
and market excess return) is contingent on their levels of market exposure. To this end, we 
have used a panel of 1467 active open-end mutual funds for the period 2004-2013. Fund-
specific time-dynamic beta has been employed and we have availed room for more policy 
implications by disaggregating the dataset into market fundamentals of: equity, fixed income, 
allocation, tax preferred. The empirical evidence is based on Quantile Regressions.  
The following findings have been established. First, there is a consistent positive threshold 
evidence of volatility and market return in market timing, with the slim exception of 
allocation funds for which the pattern of volatility is either U- or S-shaped. Second, the effect 
of volatility and market return are consistently positive and negative respectively in the 
bottom and top quintiles of market exposure, with the exception of allocation funds. Third, the 
effects of information asymmetry and aggregate liquidity are positive and negative, 
contingent on specifications, level of market exposure and market fundamentals.  
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The notion of threshold adopted in the study is such that, a positive threshold is apparent 
when throughout the distribution of market exposure, the estimates consistently display 
decreasing negative magnitudes and/or increasing positive magnitudes. In the same vein, a 
negative threshold is established when an estimated coefficient consistently displays 
decreasing positive and/or increasing negative magnitudes throughout the conditional 
distribution of market exposure. In other words, positive thresholds denote consistent 
incremental effects of the underlying estimate on market exposure.   
Our findings, especially threshold evidence have confirmed the fact that the effect of 
information asymmetry and other determinants of market exposure are contingent on existing 
levels of market exposure. Hence, ceteris paribus, with the same information on volatility and 
market excess return, a fund manager who is already comparatively more exposed to the 
market is very likely to increase his/her market exposure at a higher rate compared to his/her 
counterpart who is less exposed to the market. Hence, the degree of sensitivity to market 
exposure from market excess return and market volatility is a positive function to exiting 
levels in market exposure.  
In the light of the above, the degree of responsiveness by fund managers with low market 
exposure to the investigated factors (aggregate liquidity; information asymmetry and 
volatility) should intuitively be different from those from their counterparts with higher 
market exposure. This information is critical in the understanding of fund managers’ 
behaviour towards or reaction to common market information. Hence, policy makers who 
have been viewing fund managers’ market exposure reactions to market information 
regardless of their initial levels of market exposure may be getting their dynamics badly 
wrong.  
The findings related to market volatility and market excess return have implications for 
arbitrage and portfolio diversification in the perspective that, with information on market 
excess return and market volatility if an investor judges that the returns to more market 
exposure outweigh potential risks, everything being equal; engaging with fund managers that 
are more exposed to the market is more likely to reward the underlying investors. Conversely, 
if the investor judges that the risk/return advantage associated with more market exposure is 
great, with the same information on market excess return and market volatility, the investor is 
more likely to engage with fund managers that have less exposure to the market compared to 
their counterparts that are more exposed. The underlying patterns from our findings could 
enable a market timer to switch asset allocations and/or rebalance portfolios depending on 
his/her forecast of market fluctuations.  
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The above policy implications should also be contingent on the following trends: (i) the effect 
of information asymmetry is driven by the equity funds sub-sample; (ii) the impact of market 
volatility and market excess return are driven by equity and fixed-income sub-samples for the 
most part while (iii) the effect of aggregate liquidity is driven by the fixed income funds sub-
sample. Moreover, the fact that the incidences of market return and volatility are consistently 
negative and positive respectively in the top and bottom quintiles of market exposure further 
substantiate the suggested practical recommendations in arbitrage and portfolio 
diversification.  Overall, the findings broadly suggest that blanket responses of market 
exposure to investigated factors are unlikely to represent feasible strategies for fund managers 
unless they are contingent on initial levels of market exposure and tailored differently across 
‘highly exposed’-fund managers and ‘lowly exposed’-fund managers.  
Future studies can focus on assessing thresholds at which various determinants of market 
timing influence fund managers’ market timing ability both at the conditional mean and 
conditional distribution of market exposure. This future direction will provide insights into 
whether the signs of the determinant change when certain levels of the underlying 
determinants are reached.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1  
Definition of Variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions  Sources  
    
Market timing Beta  Measure of systematic risk. Computed  
    
Information 
Asymmetry 
Info. Asymmetry 
(IA) 
Standard deviation of the idiosyncratic risk of individual 
return. 
Computed  
    
Volatility Vol. Measure of dispersion of return (or uncertainty) of a 
security. 
Computed  
    
Market Excess 
Return 
Mkt Excess Return Difference between the return of the market and the risk 
free rate. 
 
 
Kenneth French's website    Size  SMB Small [market capitalization] Minus Big. 
   
Book-to-market HML High [book-to-market ratio] Minus Low. 
    
Aggregate Liquidity Agg.Liq. “Our monthly aggregate liquidity measure is a cross-
sectional average of individual- stock liquidity 
measures” (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003, p.643). 
Robert Stambaugh's 
Website 
    
Mutual fund categories  
  
Variables  Definitions  Source  
   
Equity  “Global equity portfolios invest in companies domiciled in developed countries 
throughout the world. Some of these portfolios may include emerging market 
countries”.(p.9) 
 
 
 
 
 
Morningstar  
  
Fixed-income “Global fixed income portfolios invest in fixed income securities from countries 
domiciled in developed countries throughout the world. Some of these portfolios 
may include fixed income securities of emerging market countries”.(p.20) 
  
Allocation  “Allocation portfolios seek to provide both capital appreciation and income by 
investing in three major areas: stocks, bonds, and cash. While these portfolios 
explore the whole world, most of them focus on the U.S., Canada, Japan, and the 
larger markets in Europe. These portfolios typically have at least 10% of assets in 
bonds and less than 70% of assets in stocks.”(p.15) 
  
Tax-preferred “US municipal fixed income portfolios invest in US municipal bond securities. 
These funds may invest nationally, or they may invest primarily in one single 
state”. (p.25) 
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